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NOTES
cedural effect of the doctrine may be great or small depending upon
the facts of the particular case.2 A second theory proposes that res
ipsa loquitur is a rule of substantive law which compels the court to
take judicial notice of the fact that the defendant was negligent.-'
There is a third view that the doctrine is merely a part of the best
evidence rule,4 i.e., where the adverse party has access to the facts
the burden of proof shifts to him.
It appears that, though not clearly committed, the Nebraska
Supreme Court favors the view advanced by Dean Prosser. The court
has stated flatly that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law
but that it merely takes the place of evidence affecting the burden of
proceeding with the case.5 In a previous case the court expressed the
view that "it (res ipsa loquitur) affords reasonable evidence . .. that
the accident arose from want of care."0
The various jurisdictions are in irreconciliable conflict as to the
procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur.7 In the majority of jurisdictions
this doctrine creates a permissible inference of negligence, and nothing
is added to the probative value of the evidence itself.8 Although such
an inference does not entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict, it as-
sures him that his case will at least be submitted to the jury. In other
jurisdictions the doctrine creates a presumption of negligence, and the
burden of going forward with the evidence is placed upon the de-
fendant.0 By this view the defendant may rebut the plaintiff's prima
facie case, but, if he offers no evidence, a verdict must be directed for
the plaintiff. Finally, in some jurisdictions application of the doc-
trine shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant, 10
who must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has not
been guilty of negligent conduct.
2 Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241
(1936).
'Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur (1945).
'This view seems to be merely an embodiment of one of the basic policy
reasons for the doctrine, the idea that the defendant normally has better access
to evidence of the cause of the accident.
ISecurity Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W.2d
127 (1954).
'Miratsky v. Beseda, 139 Neb. 299, 297 N.W. 94 (1941).
This confusion exists with regard to other presumptions as well. See
Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev.
195 (1953); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Cal. L. Rev.
245 (1943); Morgan, Presumptions, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 255 (1937).
'For a collection of cases, see Prosser, Torts § 44 (1941).
'See cases collected in Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 519 (1934).
"Both Professor Carpenter and Shain present arguments in support of this
view. See Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 10 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 166 (1937); Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur (1945).
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Not only is there a great deal of confusion when different jurisdic-
tions are compared, but even in the same jurisdiction the cases fre-
quently do not confrom to a recognizable pattern. The recent case of
Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca Cola Bottling Co." highlights the con-
fusion and uncertainty which prevail in Nebraska. First, the court
states that, "The doctrine or res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of
the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they
compel it .... It merely takes the place of evidence as affecting the
burden of proceeding with the case. ' 12 But later in the decision the
court states, "the circumstances under which a fire occurs may some-
times be such as to justify the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and impose upon the defendant the burden of proving his
freedom from fault.' 3  Both of these divergent and apparently con-
flicting statements of the law may be justified through ample authority
in previous Nebraska cases. The first statement is based upon the
line of cases holding that res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine permitting an
inference of negligence or that it affords reasonable evidence of
negligence.' 4 The second indicates that, quite to the contrary, res
ipsa loquitur imposes a rebuttable presumption of negligence. An
analysis of these decisions demonstrates the disagreement as to
whether the defendant must rebut this presumption by a preponder-
ance or merely by an equality of evidence. 15
Recognizing the confusion of certain jurisdictions (including Ne-
braska), Professor Seavey has devised a method to bring a measure
of order and predictablity to this areas of the law.' 6 He suggests that
the circumstances in any given case present only these three possible
variations: they may be such (1) that a reasonable man could not draw
an inference of negligence or of causation (the "thing" is mute); or (2)
that reasonable men could properly either draw or not draw such an
inference (the "thing" whispers); or (3) that such an inference is re-
quired even if no further evidence is introduced (the "thing" shouts).
-- 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W.2d 127 (1954). Since the court refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, its statements relating thereto are of course obiter
dictum.
1Emphasis supplied.
1 2Ibid.
Watson Bros. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, St Paul, M. & 0. Ry., 147 Neb.
880, 25 N.W.2d 396 (1947); Miratsky v. Beseda, 139 Neb. 299, 297 N. W. 94
(1941); Rocha v. Payne, 108 Neb. 246, 187 N.W. 804 (1922); Riley v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 82 Neb. 319, 117 N. W. 765 (1908).
"
5 Mercer v. Omaha and Council Bluffs Street Ry., 108 Neb. 532, 188 N.W.
296 (1922); Lincoln Traction Co. v. Shepherd, 74 Neb. 369, 104 N.W. 882 (1905);
Omaha Street Ry. v. Boesen, 74 Neb. 764, 105 N.W. 303 (1905); Lincoln Trac-
tion Co. v. Webb, 73 Neb. 136, 102 N.W. 258 (1905); Lincoln Street Ry. v. Mc-
Clellan, 54 Neb. 672, 74 N.W. 1074 (1897); Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit
Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N.W. 270 (1893).10 Comment, 63 Har. L. Rev. 643 (1950).
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With this in mind three Nebraska cases should be examined. In
Bush v. James,17 there was an automobile accident at an intersection
which the plaintiff approached from the west and the defendant from
the south. The accident occurred in a residential area on a clear day
when driving conditions were ideal. There was evidence that the
plaintiff was proceeding at an excessive rate of speed, 55 to 60 miles
per hour, but no evidence as to the defendant's speed. There were no
traffic signals at the intersection and both parties had unobstructed
vision of the approach to the intersection. The court stated that the
mere happening of an accident will not create an inference of neg-
ligence, whereupon the plaintiff's petition was dismissed.
In Miratsky v. Beseda,8 the defendant erected some temporary
bleachers upon his premises for the convenience of spectators at a
gymnastic meet. Plaintiff attended the exhibition as a spectator, sit-
ting in the third row of the bleachers. During the performance, the
bleachers collapsed, and the plaintiff was injured. Granting recovery,
the court stated that the circumstances surrounding the accident, in
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, afforded reasonable
evidence that the accident arose from want of care.
In Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb, 9 the plaintiff was a passenger on a
streetcar operated by the defendant company. As the plaintiff alighted
from the car, the motorman drove away giving no warning. Plaintiff
was thrown to the pavement and injured. Granting recovery, the
court ruled that the defendant must rebut the inference of negligence
and introduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it was equally
probable that there was no negligence.
Comparing these cases with the three types of evidentiary situations
envisioned by Professor Seavey, a striking resemblance may be noted.
Bush v. James represents the class of cases wherein the circumstances
give no hint or indication of negligence so the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur did not apply.2 0 Miratsky v. Beseda represents the class of
cases wherein the circumstances may or may not indicate a lack of
care2 1 so the doctrine affords a permissible inference of negligence.
Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb represents the class of cases wherein the
circumstances give convincing proof of a lack of care unless contrary
evidence is introduced -2 2 so the doctrine compels a rebuttable presump-
tion of negligence. When considered in this light, Nebraska's seem-
152 Neb. 189, 40 N.W.2d 667 (1950).139 Neb. 299, 297 N.W. 94 (1941).
'- 73 Neb. 136, 102 N.W. 258 (1905).
2* Scarborough v. Aeroservice, Inc., 155 Neb. 749, 53 N.W.2d 902 (1952);
Bush v. James, 152 Neb. 189, 40 N.W.2d 667 (1950); Claim of Shroeder, 153 Neb.
73, 43 N.W.2d 562 (1950); Bixby v. Ayers, 139 Neb. 652, 298 N.W. 533 (1941);
Meyers v. Neeld, 137 Neb. 428, 289 N.W. 797 (1940).
21 See note 14 supra.
2' See note 15 supra.
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ingly confused and conflicting decisions emerge in a logical and orderly
pattern. In addition this approach involves a retreat from the mystical
idea that the "magic Latin words" in some way impose liability. In-
stead, the circumstantial evidence itself dictates the procedural effect
to be given. This theory could bring a new degree of understanding
to a field of the law confused and clouded with doubts.
A collateral problem which further complicates matters concerns
the availability of res ipsa loquitur when specific acts of negligence are
alleged in the plaintiff's petition. A number of possible solutions have
been offered.23 First, allegations of specific acts of negligence may bar
the plaintiff from making use of res ipsa loquitur. Second, allegations
of specific acts of negligence may be limiting in that res ipsa loquitur
can be used only to establish these specific acts. Third, res ipsa loquitur
may be applied only in a case wherein there is a general allegation of
negligence accompanying the specific allegations. Finally, there is the
possibility that res ipsa loquitur may be available to the plaintiff
without regard to the form of pleading.
Although earlier Nebraska decisions use the terms "direct evidence"
and "the evidence shows" rather than considering the specific allega-
tions as the controlling factor, later pronouncements by the court in-
dicate that the first of the above mentioned alternatives has been
adopted in this jurisdiction. This solution is probably based upon the
idea that by pleading specific acts of negligence the plaintiff negates
the probability that the evidence as to the cause of the accident is more
available to the defendant. Thus, one major reason for the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur disappears.
The first Nebraska case to discuss this problem was Knies v. Lang,2
wherein the Court quoted a Massachusetts case, saying, "where the
evidence shows the precise cause of the accident.., there is of course
no room for the application of the doctrine of presumption." This
statement is of little utility since, if the plaintiff can show the precise
cause of the accident through direct evidence, he will rarely resort to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.25 " In Mischnick v. Iowa-Nebraska
Light & Power Co.,26 the court states the rule this way, "if the petition
alleges particular acts of negligence, then the plaintiff in order to re-
cover must establish the specific negligence alleged, and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied." The Security Ins. Co. case
" Prosser, Torts § 44 (1941); Carpenter, supra note 9.
-116 Neb. 387, 217 N.W. 615 (1928).
"
2Also see Mirautsky v. Beseda, 139 Neb. 299, 297 N.W. 94 (1941). Held:
res ipsa loquitur is not available "where there is direct evidence as to the pre-
cise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant upon
the occurrence clearly appear." This statement is of questionable value since
it is a strange case indeed wherein -all the facts and circumstances attendant
upon the occurrence clearly appear.
26 125 Neb. 598, 251 N.W. 259 (1933).

